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COMMENT
RICE'S TOYOTA WORLD, INC.: FOURTH CIRCUIT
EXTENDS SHAM TRANSACTION DOCTRINE TO
EQUIPMENT LEASING TAX SHELTER
Taxpayers have the legal right to structure financial transactions in a
manner that minimizes tax liability.' The sham transaction doctrine, however,
permits courts to disregard certain transactions for tax purposes.2 In certain
circumstances courts apply a business purpose test to determine whether a
particular transaction is a sham.3 Other courts, however, implement an
economic substance test to determine whether a transaction is a sham. 4 While
1. See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 580 (1978) (courts recognize
that tax laws affect formation of many business transactions); Commissioner v. Brown, 380
U.S. 563, 579-80 (1965) (Harlin, J., concurring) (courts realize that tax planning is economic
reality and that taxpayers consider effect of tax laws in evaluating financial transactions);
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 819 (2d Cir. 1934) (tax laws do not require taxpayers to
choose tax alternatives that best benefit government; increasing one's personal income tax
liability is not patriotic duty), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); McLane v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.
140, 145 (1966) (court will not necessarily disallow transaction because transaction contains
some tax benefits).
2. See, e.g., Boyter v. Commissioner, 668 F.2d 1382, 1387 (4th Cir. 1981) (implementing
sham transaction doctrine to uphold deficiency assessed against taxpayers who obtained divorces
in foreign countries close to end of tax years, to enable taxpayers to file separate tax returns
utilizing lower rates); Boynton v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1168, 1172 (5th Cir. 1981) (utilizing
sham transaction doctrine to uphold deficiency assessed against taxpayers who allocated income
in manner that allowed taxpayer to shift income from partners in high tax bracket to partners
in lower tax brackets), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1146 (1982); Davis v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d
807, 812 (6th Cir. 1978) (disallowing sale and leaseback transaction involving apartment building
on basis that transaction was sham); see infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text (analysis of
cases decided using sham transaction doctrine).
3. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945) (analyzing
business purpose for form of business adopted by taxpayer in evaluating whether entity
constituted sham); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935) (examining business purpose
of corporate reorganization to determine whether transaction constituted sham); Rosenfeld v.
Commissioner, 706 F.2d 1277, 1282 (2d Cir. 1983) (evaluating business purpose to determine
whether gift leaseback transaction constituted sham). In Gregory v. Helvering, the United States
Supreme Court first developed the business purpose test in disallowing a corporate reorganization
for tax purposes. See Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469. In Gregory, the taxpayer effectuated a corporate
reorganization in compliance with the tax laws. Id. at 467. Subsequently, the taxpayer liquidated
the newly formed transferee corporation. Id. The Supreme Court determined that the taxpayer
effectuated the reorganization for the sole purpose of converting ordinary dividend income into
capital gains. Id. at 470. Because the reorganization lacked the business purpose that the tax
laws contemplated, the Supreme Court disallowed the reorganization. Id. at 469; see infra note
46 and accompanying text (discussion of transactions evaluated using business purpose test).
See generally, Rice, Judicial Techniques in Combating Tax Avoidance, 51 MICH. L. REV. 1021,
1041-46 (1953) (discussing business purpose test).
4. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 369 (1960) (evaluating economic
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the application of the sham transaction doctrine does not necessarily imply
fraudulent activity, courts use the doctrine to look beyond the form of a
transaction and evaluate the transaction's true substance.s In evaluating the
form of a transaction, courts frequently combine broad judicial tax doctrines,
substance of investment transaction to determine whether transaction constituted sham); Grodt
& McKay Realty Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1221, 1243 (1981) (analyzing economic substance
of cattle sale transaction to determine whether transaction constitutes sham); May v. Commis-
sioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 279, 280 (1972) (evaluating economic substance of transaction
involving sale of television films to determine whether transaction constituted sham). In Knetsch
v. United States, the United States Supreme Court developed the economic substance test, in
disallowing a series of investment transactions for tax purposes. See Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 369.
In Knetsch, the taxpayer engaged in a series of investment transactions designed solely to
generate interest deductions. Id. at 369. Because the transactions provided no economic benefit
to the taxpayer, apart from tax benefits, the Supreme Court disallowed the transactions as
shams. Id.; see infra note 100 and accompanying text (analysis of Knetsch v. United States);
infra notes 46-57 and accompanying text (analysis of transactions evaluated using economic
substance test).
5. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945) (courts base
tax liability upon substance of transaction and not transaction's form); Helvering v. Lazarus &
Co., 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939) (courts and Internal Revenue Service analyze substance of
transactions rather than technical form selected by taxpayers); Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1221, 1236 (1981) (in evaluating validity of transactions, courts analyze
business and economic realities of transactions rather than forms and labels). See generally,
Blum, How the Courts, Congress and the IRS Try to Limit Legal Tax Avoidance, 10 J. TAX'N
300 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Blum, Limit Legal Tax Avoidance] (courts implement sham
transaction doctrine to look beyond form of financial transactions). In Helvering v. Lazarus &
Co., the United States Supreme Court analyzed the true substance of a sale and leaseback
transaction, in allowing a depreciation deduction for tax purposes. Lazarus, 308 U.S. at 255.
The taxpayer in Lazarus transferred legal title in certain buildings to a bank land trust. Id. at
253. Nevertheless, taxpayer claimed deductions for depreciation on the buildings. Id. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) disallowed the depreciation deduction
because the taxpayer had transferred legal title to the bank land trust. Id. In analyzing the true
substance of the lease transaction, the Supreme Court determined that the transaction was a
mere financing arrangement and allowed the taxpayer to retain the depreciation deduction. Id.
at 255.
Courts are likely to penetrate the form of a transaction and evaluate the transaction's
substance when a taxpayer engages in self dealing. See Bittker, Pervasive Judicial Doctrines in
the Construction of Internal Revenue Code, 21 How. L.J. 693, 707 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Bittker, Judicial Doctrines]. Courts scrutinize self dealing transactions closely because taxpayers
often select the transaction's form solely for the tax consequences. Id. In arm's length
transactions, however, taxpayers usually engage in negotiations that result in economically
realistic terms. Id. In negotiations, one party often will lose a tax advantage when the other
party gains a tax advantage. Id. Accordingly, arm's length transactions are less vulnerable to
substance over form attacks. Id. See generally Underwood, Form and Substance in Tax Cases,
16 VA. L. Rav. 327 (1930) (discussing court's use of substance and form in tax cases).
In various situations the form of a transaction will control over the transaction's substance,
regardless of tax motives. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 101(a) (West 1985) (excluding amounts received
under life insurance contracts, by reason of death of insured, from gross income); id. § 472
(allows taxpayer to adopt last-in-first-out inventory accounting method); id.. § 451 (gives
taxpayer election to adopt cash basis of accounting for tax purposes). See generally, Blum, The
Importance of Form in the Taxation of Corporate Transactions, 54 TAxES 613 (1976) (overview
of principles for determining role of form in tax cases).
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thus blurring a given doctrine's independent significance. 6 Courts hesitate to
apply the sham transaction doctrine due to the strong negative implications
that the doctrine imports.7 In Rice's Toyotal World, Inc. v. Commissioner,8
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explicitly combined
the business purpose and economic substance tests to determine what con-
stitutes a sham transaction in analyzing the validity of a sale and leaseback 9
transaction for tax purposes."0
6. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 15.06 (4th ed. 1979). When courts disregard the form of a transaction to
evaluate the substance, courts generally do not specify which judicial concepts either individually
or in combination the court is applying. Id. Accordingly, decisions based on some variant of a
substance over form analysis yield little precise or consistent analysis. Id.; see Bittker, supra
note 5, at 707 (discussing court's application of judicial doctrines such as business purpose, step
transaction, and substance over form doctrines).
7. See B. BrrTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 6 at 15.07 (courts consider disallowing
entire transactions as sham as drastic measure); Blum, supra note 5, at 300 (classification of
transaction as sham is courts method of revealing emotional reaction to taxpayer's scheme).
8. 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985), aff'g, 81 T.C. 184 (1983).
9. See Cook, Sales and Leasebacks, TAx MGMT. (BNA) No. 36-3d, A-1 (1981). A sale
and leaseback transaction generally involves the sale of property to a buyer with the buyer
simultaneously leasing the asset back to the seller for a term of years, representing the useful
life of the asset. Id. The parties usually structure the lease payments made by the seller to the
buyer to amortize the purchase price and provide a return for the buyer. Id.
Parties enter into sale and leaseback transactions for various financial and tax reasons. See
Stewart, Taxation of Sale and Leaseback Transactions-A General Review, 32 VAND. L. REv.
945, 949-54 (1979). The sale and leaseback transaction is financially beneficial to the seller
because the trhnsaction improves financial leverage and liquidity by replacing the disposed
property from seller's balance sheet with the more liquid notes or cash received from the sale.
Id. With a more liquid balance sheet, the seller can enter the financial markets more easily to
obtain additional financing for other investments. Id. The sale and leaseback transaction also
enables the seller to obtain 100% financing of a capital asset. Id. Generally, lenders will agree
only to finance 75% to 80% of an asset's purchase price. Id. Another advantage of the sale
and leaseback transaction is the fact that the seller is obligated only to use the property for the
lease term. See Zeitlin, Tax Planning in Equipment-Leasing Shelters, 21 MAJOR TAX PLANNiNG
621, 624 (1969). Consequently, if the sale and leaseback involves equipment, which could
become obsolete, the burdens of ownership will not hinder the seller in replacing the equipment
at the end of the lease term. Id. From the buyer's perspective, sale and leaseback transactions
often generate a higher rate of return than other available investments because sellers usually
pay a premium rental fee in exchange for 100% financing by the buyer. See Stewart, supra, at
951.
The tax advantages of sale and leaseback transactions to the seller include being able to
deduct lease rental payments even when the leased property is a nondepreciable asset, such as
land, or a fully depreciated asset. Id. Additionally, if the fair market value of the asset has
decreased below the asset's book value, the seller can effectuate the sale and leaseback transaction
recognizing a loss on the disposition. Id. If the fair market value of the asset has appreciated
above the asset's book value, the seller can effectuate a gain on the disposition by executing a
sale and leaseback transaction. Id. The taxpayer may apply the gain to net operating loss
carryovers that are about to expire. Id.
Sale and leaseback transactions offer various tax advantages to the buyer. Id. at 953. The
buyer, as owner of the property, can deduct the depreciation expense from the property. Id.
Additionally, the buyer can deduct interest on debt used to purchase the property, depending
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Rice's Toyota World, Inc. (Rice's Toyota), an automobile dealership in
Greensboro, North Carolina, entered into a sale and lease back transaction
with Finalco, Inc. (Finalco), an equipment leasing tax shelter broker."
Previously having purchased a six-year old computer for $1,297,643, Finalco
sold the computer to Rice's Toyota for $1,455,277.22 Rice's Toyota paid for
the computer by giving Finalco a recourse promissory note for $280,000,
payable over three years, and two nonrecourse promissory notes totaling
$1,205,227, payable over eight years.' 3 Finalco agreed to lease the computer
on the method of financing. Id. The depreciation and interest deductions can offset the income
produced by the leaseback. Id. In addition, if the buyer adopts an accelerated method of
depreciation, the overall sale and leaseback transaction could result in a deductible loss, available
to offset other income. Id. Another tax advantage that sale and leaseback transactions offer to
the buyer is that, if the property qualifies, the buyer can claim an investment tax credit. See
Cook, supra, at A-4.
Some courts attack the validity of sale and leaseback transactions by classifying the
transactions as financing agreements. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 258,
269 (3d Cir. 1977) (because lessee bore burdens of ownership and terms of lease resembled
conventional financing, court recognized sale and leaseback transaction as mere financing
arrangement for tax purposes); American Realty Trust v. United States, 498 F.2d 1194, 1197
(4th Cir. 1974) (evaluating purchase option price in determining sale and leaseback did not
constitute mere financing agreement); Lockhart Leasing Co. v. Commissioner, 446 F.2d 269,
272 (10th Cir. 1971) (because purchase option price included in lease term equaled property's
fair market value, court considered sale and leaseback valid for tax purposes). Another court
has disallowed loss deductions resulting from a sale and leaseback transaction by classifying the
transaction as a like-kind exchange. See Century Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155, 158
(8th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952). In Century Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that a sale and leaseback
merely constituted an exchange of an asset for a functionally equivalent leasehold in the identical
asset. Id. at 160. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit disallowed the loss deductions resulting from the
sale and leaseback transaction. Id.; see I.R.C. § 1031 (West 1985) (like-kind exchange of
property owned for investment or productive use). A third method that courts use to disallow
sale and leaseback transactions for tax purposes is by declaring that the transaction lacks
economic substance. See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (overview of cases where
courts have analyzed validity of sale and leaseback transactions based on economic reality). See
generally REV. RUL. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39, 41-44 (Commissioner's guidelines for determining
tax effect of lease transactions); REv. PROC. 75-21, 1975-1 C.B. 715 (Commissioner's guidelines
for obtaining advance rulings on recognition of lease transactions for tax purposes); Equipment
Leasing Tax Shelters, in EXAMNATION TAX SHELTERS HANDBOOK 852 (Revenue Agent's criteria
for determining whether transaction is leasing arrangement or mere financing agreement)
[hereinafter cited as Examination Tax Shelter Handbook]; BrrTKER & MEMKOFF, Restructuring
Business Transactions for Federal Income Tax Purposes, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 715, 717 (discussing
criteria used to determine whether lease transaction is sale or lease for tax purposes).
10. 752 F.2d at 91.
11. Id.
12. Id. The Rice's Toyota lease transaction involved a six-year old mainframe computer
and related peripheral equipment. 81 T.C. at 192.
13. 81 T.C. at 192. In Rice's Toyota, Rice's Toyota paid the recourse debt of $280,000
in four installments at 12076 interest. Id. The parties agreed to amortize the nonrecourse debt
over a 96 month period, bearing simple interest of 8%. Appellee's Brief at 3, Rice's Toyota
World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985); see Javaras, Nonrecourse Debt in
Real Estate and Other Investments, 56 TAXES 801, 801 (1978) (nonrecourse debt is debt secured
solely by property, with no personal obligation of debtor).
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back from Rice's Toyota for eight years, but with the lease payments
contingent upon Finalco receiving adequate revenues from subleasing the
computer.' 4 Prior to entering into the sale and leaseback transaction with
Rice's Toyota, Finalco had executed a five-year sublease with Owen-Illinois
Corporation. 5 The sale and leaseback transaction generated a $10,000 net
annual cash flow to Rice's Toyota for at least the first five years.' 6 The lease
agreement between Rice's Toyota and Finalco also entitled Finalco to a
thirty percent remarketing fee for either selling or re-leasing the computer at
the end of the five-year sublease.' 7 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(Commissioner) contested the amount of depreciation and interest expense
deductions, related to the sale and leaseback transaction, taken by Rice's
Toyota in computing its taxable income for the tax years ending 1976, 1977,
and 1978.18 Rice's Toyota filed a petition with the United States Tax Court
(Tax Court) for a redetermination of the Commissioner's assessment of a
deficiency in federal income tax due from Rice's Toyota.' 9
The Tax Court identified three tax liability issues in evaluating the sale
and leaseback transaction. 20 The issues included whether the Tax Court
should allow Rice's Toyota to deduct the depreciation expense related to the
computer, the interest expense related to the recourse note, or the interest
expense related to the nonrecourse notes. 2' After evaluating Rice's Toyota's
motives for entering the transaction and the economic realities of the
transaction, the Tax Court determined that Rice's Toyota entered the trans-
action for no purpose other than tax avoidance. 22 In addition, the Tax Court
stated that the transaction showed no potential to generate a profit, and
therefore lacked economic substance. 23 Accordingly, the Tax Court upheld
14. 81 T.C. at 195.
15. Id. at 194. In Rice's Toyota, Finalco did not guarantee that the lease transaction
could generate a cash flow after the expiration of the five-year sublease. Id. at 195.
16. Id. at 192. Rice's Toyota's monthly nonrecourse debt payments of $16,925 and
Finalco's $17,758 monthly rental payments netted to an annual cash flow of $10,000. Id.
17. 752 F.2d at 91. In Rice's Toyota, Finalco's representative testified at trial that Finalco
agreed to waive the 30% fee to insure Rice's Toyota a gain on the transaction. Appellee's Brief
at 26, n.12, Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985). The
United States Tax Court (Tax Court), however, disregarded Finalco's representative's testimony
because the oral agreement to waive the 3007o re-leasing fee ignores the language of the leasing
agreement, and none of the testimony from representatives' of Rice's Toyota supported waiver.
Id. The lease agreement entitled Finalco to only the 30% fee if Finalco could re-lease or sell
the computer. 81 T.C. at 195. Because Rice's Toyota had no experience in the computer
industry, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that Rice's
Toyota could not re-lease or sell the computer without Finalco's assistance. 752 F.2d at 94.
18. 81 T.C. at 185.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 195-98.
21. Id. at 185.
22. Id. at 210.
23. Id.
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the deficiency asserted against Rice's Toyota, holding that the sale and
leaseback transaction constituted a sham.
24
Rice's Toyota appealed the Tax Court decision to the Fourth Circuit, 2
asserting that Rice's Toyota entered the transaction with the intent to earn
a profit and that the transaction feasibly could earn a profit. 6 Alternatively,
Rice's Toyota asserted that, even if the transaction constituted a sham, the
court should allow the interest deduction taken on the recourse note. 27 The
Fourth Circuit determined that Rice's Toyota entered the transaction with
no business purposes other than tax avoidance and the sale and leaseback
transaction objectively lacked economic substance. 2 Accordingly, the Fourth
Circuit determined that the sale and leaseback transaction constituted a
sham. 29 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, affirmed the Tax Court's decision in
part by upholding the disallowance of the entire depreciation expense deduc-
tion and the interest expense deduction from the nonrecourse loan. 0 The
Fourth Circuit, however, reversed the Tax Court's decision in part by
allowing the interest expense deduction from the recourse note.3 '
The Fourth Circuit made a factual analysis to determine whether suffi-
cient evidence existed to support the Tax Court's finding that Rice's Toyota
entered the transaction with no subjective business purpose and that the
transaction objectively lacked economic substance.3 2 In making the determi-
nations, the Rice's Toyota court focused primarily on factors relating to the
computer's residual value. 33 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the president
of Rice's Toyota's failure to analyze the computer's residual value, while
knowing that the transaction needed substantial residual value in order to
earn a profit, indicated that Rice's Toyota entered the transaction with no
subjective business purpose.3 4 In determining that the lease transaction
24. Id.
25. 752 F.2d at 91. The taxpayer or the Commissioner may appeal a Tax Court decision
to the proper United States Court of Appeals. I.R.C. § 7482(a) (West 1985). Proper venue for
an appeal rested in the Fourth Circuit because Rice's Toyota was a North Carolina corporation.
See id. § 7482(b)(1)(B) (circuit in which taxpayer's principal place of business is located is
proper venue for redetermination of corporate tax liability).
26. Appellant's Brief at 26, Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89 (4th
Cir. 1985).
27. Id. at 40.




32. Id. at 92-95; see Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 333-34 (1945)
(whether transaction lacks substance and thus constitutes sham is question of fact and reviewable
only under clearly erroneous standard).
33. 752 F.2d at 92-94; see infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text (analysis of Fourth
Circuit's conclusion based on computer's residual value); see also A. Rosenberg, EVALUATING
TAX SHELTER OFFERIN Gs addendum 6 (1982) (residual value refers to value of investment over
balance of liabilities that taxpayer must discharge at time taxpayer disposes of investment).
34. 752 F.2d at 92. In Rice's Toyota, the Finalco representative visited Rice's Toyota to
discuss the investment aspects of the lease transaction with Rice's Toyota's president, accountant,
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objectively lacked economic substance, the Fourth Circuit relied primarily
on the fact that the computer's residual value, as projected by expert
witnesses, was insufficient to recoup Rice's Toyota's investment.35 In addition
to focusing on the computer's residual value, the Fourth Circuit noted that
the nonrecourse debt balance exceeded the computer's fair market value and
that Rice's Toyota paid an inflated price for the computer. 6 Because the
nonrecourse debt balance exceeded the computer's fair market value, the
Fourth Circuit inferred that Rice's Toyota intended to abandon the trans-
action prior to the realization of taxable income. 37 In addition, the Rice's
Toyota court inferred that Rice's Toyota's willingness to pay the inflated
purchase price indicated that the president of Rice's Toyota considered only
and counsel. 81 T.C. at 188. Finalco's representative indicated that the president of Rice's
Toyota must consider the computer's residual value in determining the lease transaction's
potential for profit. Id. Rice's Toyota's accountant also informed the president of Rice's Toyota
that a substantial residual value would be necessary in order to make the lease transaction
profitable. Id. Despite the warnings regarding the need for substantial residual value, the
president of Rice's Toyota declined Finalco's representative's offer to provide an independent
appraisal of the computer equipment. Id. The president of Rice's Toyota testified that he did
not rely on expert advice or appraised values in making his investment decision. Appellant's
Brief at 7, Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985). The
president of Rice's Toyota testified that he made investment decisions based on the people
involved, the product, and the potential return. Id. Additionally, the president of Rice's Toyota
testified that, when an investment looked either too good or too conservative, he generally
avoided the investment. Id.
35. 752 F.2d at 94. The Rice's Toyota court concluded that Rice's Toyota owned only a
70070 interest in the computer because the lease agreement entitled Finalco to 30% of all revenues
from re-leasing or selling the computer. Id.; see supra note 16 and accompanying text (lease
transaction provided $10,000 annual cash flow to Rice's Toyota). Accordingly, the Fourth
Circuit determined that, because the original five-year sublease would return only $50,000 of
the $280,000 recourse investment, Rice's Toyota would have to realize a $286,000 residual value
to recoup the remaining $230,000 recourse investment. 752 F.2d at 94.
36. 752 F.2d at 93-94; see infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text (analysis of Fourth
Circuit's conclusions based on disparity between computer's fair market value and nonrecourse
loan balance).
37. 752 F.2d at 93. The Fourth Circuit supported the court's inference that Rice's Toyota
intended to abandon the transaction prior to the realization of taxable income based on the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's decision in Estate of Franklin v.
Commissioner. Id.; see Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir.
1976) (disallowing sale and leaseback of building that taxpayer purchased with nonrecourse
loans exceeding building's fair market value); infra notes 72-74 and accompanying test (analysis
of Estate of Franklin). In Rice's Toyota, Finalco structured the lease transaction to generate
tax losses in the first four years and taxable income in the final four years of the lease. 81 T.C.
at 182. Rice's Toyota argued that it could not abandon the transaction to avoid taxable income
in the final four years of the transaction. 752 F.2d at 94. Rice's Toyota noted that, in
Commissioner v. Tufts, the United States Supreme Court held that a taxpayer who sold property
encumbered by a nonrecourse loan must include the unpaid amount of the nonrecourse loan in
the computation of the amount the taxpayer realized on the sale. Id.; see Commissioner v.
Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 317 (1983) (requiring taxpayer to include outstanding, nonrecourse mortgage
in amount realized when taxpayer sold building). Because the Supreme Court did not decide
Tufts until after Rice's Toyota entered the transaction, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that Tufts
had no significance in the evaluation of Rice's Toyota's motivations for entering the transaction.
752 F.2d at 94.
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the transaction's tax benefits.3 8 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit determined
that, because the transaction lacked both business purpose and economic
substance, the transaction constituted a sham.
39
Upon determining that the lease transaction constituted a sham, the
Rice's Toyota court evaluated the lease transaction's true substance to
determine whether Rice's Toyota could deduct the interest and depreciation
expenses." In evaluating the lease transaction's true substance, the Fourth
Circuit stated that Rice's Toyota had no equitable basis to support a
depreciation deduction because the outstanding balance of the nonrecourse
note exceeded the computer's fair market value. 4' Additionally, the Rice's
Toyota court concluded that the disparity between the computer's fair market
value and the outstanding balance of the nonrecourse note disqualified the
nonrecourse note's ability to support a deduction for interest expense. 42 In
evaluating the deductibility of the recourse loan interest expense, however,
the Rice's Toyota court determined that the recourse loan could support an
interest expense deduction.43 The Fourth Circuit distinguished the recourse
loan from the nonrecourse loan based on Rice's Toyota's unlimited obligation
to repay the recourse loan." The Rice's Toyota court refuted the Tax Court's
position that, once a court classifies a transaction as a sham, the entire
transaction loses validity for tax purposes.
4
1
The Fourth Circuit correctly looked to the subjective business purpose
46
38. 752 F.2d at 93.
39. Id. at 95.
40. Id.
41. Id. The Rice's Toyota court supported the disallowance of the depreciation deduction
based on the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner. Id.; see Estate of
Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 1976) (disallowing depreciation expense
deduction because nonrecourse purchase price exceeded related asset's fair market value); infra
notes 72-74 and accompanying text (analysis of Estate of Franklin).
42. 752 F.2d at 95.
43. Id. at 96.
44. Id.
45. Id.; see 81 T.C. at 207 (Tax Court held that Rice's Toyota could not deduct recourse
interest because sham transaction doctrine rendered entire transaction invalid).
46. See 752 F.2d at 92 (Rice's Toyota court selected objective business purpose test as
one element of sham transaction definition); Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 742
(1949) (evaluating form of business adopted by taxpayer to determine whether taxpayer owed
additional tax). In Commissioner v. Culbertson, the United States Supreme Court held that, to
determine whether taxpayers enter a transaction with a business purpose, courts should evaluate
the transaction's components, the taxpayer's actions in executing the transaction, the taxpayer's
testimony, the testimony of independent parties and any other factors that offer insight to the
taxpayer's intent. Culbertson, 377 U.S. at 742; see also Poggetto v. United States, 306 F.2d 76,
80 (9th Cir. 1962) (subjective standard applied to determine whether business form served valid
business purpose); Harkness v. Commissioner, 193 F.2d 655, 657 (9th Cir. 1951) (subjective
standard applied to determine whether partnership form lacked valid business purpose), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 945 (1952).
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and objective economic substance 47 tests in defining a sham transaction.48 In
prior decisions, the Fourth Circuit applied either a subjective business
purpose or objective economic substance test to determine whether a trans-
action constituted a sham. 49 Other federal circuit courts also have applied
either the business purpose test or the economic substance test to determine
whether a transaction is a shamA0 For example, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Davis v. Commissioner," reviewed the
business purpose of a sale and leaseback transaction involving apartment
buildings to determine whether a transaction constituted a sham.12 The Davis
court concluded that the lease transaction constituted a sham because the
parties entered the lease transaction solely to receive the benefits of the tax
deductions. 3 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in
47. See 752 F.2d at 94 (Rice's Toyota court selected objective economic substance as one
element of sham transaction test). Courts generally look at objective economic realities to
determine whether a transaction contains economic substance. See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v.
United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573 (1978) (evaluating objective realities of lease transactions in
determining whether lease transaction contained economic substance); Knetsch v. United States,
364 U.S. 361, 364 (1960) (analyzing transaction's objective economic benefits to taxpayer apart
from tax reduction in determining transaction was sham); Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.
305, 348 (1980) (reviewing objective factors surrounding lease transaction to determine whether
economic substance existed aside from tax considerations), aff'd per curiam, 671 F.2d 316 (9th
Cir. 1982).
48. See 752 F.2d at 95 ( Rice's Toyota court combined business purpose and economic
substance tests in defining sham transaction).
49. See, e.g., Boyter v. Commissioner, 668 F.2d 1382, 1387 (4th Cir. 1981) (Fourth
Circuit evaluated economic substance of taxpayer's transaction to determine whether transaction
constituted sham); Bridges v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 180, 185 (4th Cir. 1963) (Fourth Circuit
focused on transaction's economic substance in disallowing investment transaction for tax
purposes); Funai v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 890, 895 (4th Cir. 1950) (Fourth Circuit considered
business purpose of form of business adopted by taxpayer in evaluating whether sham existed);
see infra notes 105-110 and accompanying text (analysis of Bridges v. Commissioner).
50. See, e.g., May v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 1434, 1437 (9th Cir. 1984) (Ninth Circuit
evaluated economic reality and business purpose of gift leaseback transaction to determine
whether sham existed); Boynton v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1168, 1172 (5th Cir. 1981) (Fifth
Circuit analyzed economic effect of partnership profit allocation to determine whether sham
existed), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1146 (1982); Hagist Ranch, Inc. v. Commissioner, 295 F.2d
351, 354 (7th Cir. 1961) (Seventh Circuit evaluated business purpose of corporate taxpayer to
determine whether corporation was sham to avoid tax liability rather than entity to effectuate
liquidation of bankrupt estate); see also EXAMINATION TAX SHELTER HANDBOOK, supra note 9,
at 831 (Commissioner's method of evaluating equipment leasing tax shelters). The Commissioner
evaluates the validity of equipment leasing tax shelters based on the taxpayer's intent to earn a
profit by entering the transaction, and the objective factors that indicate whether a realistic
opportunity for economic profit justifies the form of the transaction. Id. The Commissioner
focuses primarily on the transaction's potential to earn a profit in deciding whether the
transaction is legitimate for tax purposes. Id. at 832. In measuring a transaction's potential to
earn a profit, the Commissioner performs quantitative tests such as a present value test and a
rate of return test. Id. at 872-73.
51. 585 F.2d 807 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979).
52. Id. at 813.
53. Id. at 812. The Davis court determined that the taxpayers entered the sale and
19861
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:317
Holman v. United States,54 analyzed the economic substance of a trust
created to shift income to other family members in order to avoid income
taxes.5 5 The Holman court determined that the trust constituted a sham
because the taxpayers' dual status as trustees and beneficiaries of the trust
did not alter the taxpayers' economic position.56 Therefore, in formulating
the definition of a sham transaction in Rice's Toyota, the Fourth Circuit
explicitly combined criteria that courts generally have implemented in deter-
mining whether a transaction is a sham.1
7
While focusing on the computer's residual value, the Fourth Circuit
correctly determined that Rice's Toyota entered the lease transaction with
no business purpose. 8 The president of Rice's Toyota knew that Rice's
Toyota would have to realize a substantial residual value from the computer
in order to recoup the recourse investment.5 9 The failure to make a reasonable
analysis of the residual value therefore suggests that tax avoidance purposes,
rather than a business purpose, motivated Rice's Toyota to enter the sale
and leaseback transaction. 60 The Tax Court has suggested that at some point
naivete becomes an intentional refusal to analyze an investment's true
potential when the investment's tax reduction benefits alone justify the
investment. 6' Additionally, by focusing on the computer's residual value, the
Rice's Toyota court properly determined that the lease transaction objectively
lacked economic substance. 62 At the inception of the lease, no reasonable
possibility of a profit existed, apart from the tax benefits. 63 With the initial
leaseback transaction of several apartment buildings for the sole purpose of acquiring interest
and depreciation deductions to shelter other income. Id.
54. 728 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1984).
55. Id. at 465.
56. Id.
57. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text (analysis of factors used by courts to
determine whether given transaction constitutes sham).
58. See 752 F.2d at 92 (Fourth Circuit determined that Rice's Toyota entered transaction
with no business purpose).
59. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (several sources informed president of Rice's
Toyota that computer equipment's residual value must be substantial in order to recognize
profit from transaction).
60. See Brannen v. Commissioner, 722 F.2d 695, 704 (11th Cir. 1984) (emphasizing that
failure to apparise valuable asset prior to purchase indicated that taxpayer did not engage in
activity in business like manner for profit); Fox v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 972, 1010 (1983)
(considering size of financial investment involved, failure to seek independent appraisal of
asset's value indicated that taxpayer did not enter transaction with business purpose other than
tax avoidance), aff'd, 731 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1984).
61. See Flowers v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 914, 940 (1983) (noting that when taxpayer,
having very little knowledge of investment, invests substantial amount of funds, without
independent appraisal, indicates that taxpayer considered only tax reduction aspects of invest-
ment).
62. See 752 F.2d at 95 (Rice's Toyota court found that lease transaction lacked economic
substance).
63. Id.; see Bridges v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 180, 184 (4th Cir. 1963) (courts do not
consider transaction sham for tax purposes when reasonable chance for profit exists, based on
realistic terms of transaction).
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five-year sublease guaranteeing only a $50,000 return, Rice's Toyota would
have to recoup the remaining $230,000 recourse investment by either selling
or re-leasing the computer." The expert testimony produced at trial regarding
used computer residual values, supports the contention that, at the expiration
of the lease, Rice's Toyota could not realize an overall gain on the transaction
from the sale of the computer. 65 Furthermore, the likelihood of Rice's Toyota
or Finalco securing a profitable sublease, after the expiration of the initial
five-year sublease, to generate an overall profit from the transaction, was
remote."6 Accordingly, the transaction would not prove profitable, apart
from the tax benefits. 6
In supplementing the conclusions based on the computer's residual value,
the Rice's Toyota court drew valid inferences from the fact that Rice's
Toyota used nonrecourse debt to inflate the computer's purchase price. 6" The
Fourth Circuit correctly inferred that Rice's Toyota intended to abandon the
transaction prior to the realization of taxable income.69 Because the outstand-
ing balance of the nonrecourse loan exceeded the computer's fair market
value, the Fourth Circuit had a sufficient factual predicate reasonably to
infer that Rice's Toyota intended to abandon the transaction prior to realizing
taxable income.7 0 The United Sates Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's
analysis, in Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner,7 1 supports the Fourth
Circuit's abandonment inference.7 2 In Estate of Franklin, the taxpayer en-
tered a sale and leaseback involving a motel, with a purchase price inflated
by the use of nonrecourse debt. 73 The Estate of Franklin court stated that,
64. 752 F.2d at 94.
65. See 81 T.C. at 205 (summarizing expert testimony from trial regarding computer
equipment residual value).
66. See 752 F.2d at 92-94 (Rice's Toyota court did not speculate on possibility of recouping
investment from re-leasing computer equipment). In order for Rice's Toyota to recoup the
$230,000 net recourse investment outstanding at the end of the five-year sublease by re-leasing
the computer equipment, Rice's Toyota would have had to enter comparable lease agreements
yielding a $10,000 cash flow for 23 years. See id. (analyzing Rice's Toyota's ability to recoup
investment); supra note 16 and accompanying text (lease transaction generated $10,000 annual
cash flow to Rice's Toyota). Based on the obsolescence of computer equipment, the possibility
of re-leasing the computer equipment for 23 more years was remote. See 81 T.C. at 192 (newer
systems render most old computers uneconomic to use within 13 years).
67. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (analysis of Rice's Toyota's lease transac-
tion's profit potential, apart from tax benefits).
68. See 752 F.2d at 92-94 (Rice's Toyota court made inferences from fact that Rice's
Toyota used nonrecourse debt to inflate computer's purchase price).
69. See id. at 93 (Rice's Toyota court inferred that Rice's Toyota intend to abandon lease
transaction prior to realizing taxable income).
70. See id. at 91 (In Rice's Toyota, outstanding balance of nonrecourse loan exceeded
computer's fair market value); infra note 126 (courts consider objective facts in evaluating
taxpayer's intentions).
71. 544 F.2d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 1976).
72. See note 74 and accompanying text (explanation of abandonment theory supported
by Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner).
73. Estate of Franklin, 544 F.2d at 1048. In Estate of Franklin, a taxpayer invested in
the sale and leaseback of a motel. Id. at 1046. The investment required a $75,000 down payment
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when the nonrecourse purchase price of an asset exceeds the asset's fair
market value, the taxpayer's payments on the asset create no equity and the
taxpayer would be prudent to abandon the transaction.7 4
In evaluating whether Rice's Toyota had a business purpose for entering
the lease transaction, the Fourth Circuit considered properly Rice's Toyota's
willingness to pay an inflated purchase price for the computer.7 5 Rice's
Toyota negotiated only the terms of the $280,000 recourse investment and
not the computer's purchase price.7 6 Similarly, in analyzing the validity of a
book manuscript tax shelter, the Fourth Circuit in Barnard v. Commis-
sioner,77 approved the Tax Court's determination that a lack of concern
during negotiations for a purchase price, inflated by the use of nonrecourse
loans, indicated that a taxpayer contemplated only the tax benefits of the
transaction.
7 8
Upon determining that the lease transaction lacked a business purpose
and that the transaction objectively lacked economic substance, the Rice's
Toyota court correctly deemed the sale and leaseback a sham.7 9 The Fourth
Circuit then proceeded to pierce the labels of the lease transaction in order
to evaluate the transaction's true substance. s0 In evaluating the lease trans-
action's true substance, the Fourth Circuit properly focused on the disparity
between the computer's fair market value and the nonrecourse debt's out-
standing balance, in disallowing the deductions for depreciation and interest
expense."' In disallowing the depreciation deduction, however, the Rice's
in the form of prepaid interest and the issuance of a $1,224,000 nonrecourse note. Id. The
seller purchased the motel in the year prior to the transaction for $660,000. Id. at 1048 n.4.
74. Id. at 1048.
75. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (previously having purchased used computer
for $1,297,643, Finalco sold computer to Rice's Toyota for $1,455,277); see also Flowers, 80
T.C. at 937 (disparity between indebtedness and fair market value of property acquired taints
indications of profit objective); Narver v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 53, 102 (1980) (possibility
exists that taxpayer entered transaction for tax avoidance motives when seller requires small
downpayment with remainder of purchase price being satisfied with nonrecourse loans that are
not reasonably comparable to fair market value of purchased property) aff'd per curiam 670
F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1982).
76. See Appellee's Brief at 27, Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89
(4th Cir. 1985) (Rice's Toyota negotiated only method of cash payment upon entering lease
transaction).
77. 731 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1984).
78. Id. at 231-32.
79. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (when taxpayer enters transaction with no
business purpose and transaction lacks economic substance, court considers transaction sham).
80. 752 F.2d at 95; see supra note 5 and accompanying text (when court finds transaction
is sham, courts look beyond form of transaction and evaluate substance).
81. See 752 F.2d at 95 (Fourth circuit noted disparity between computer's value and
nonrecourse loan balance). Several courts have focused on a disparity between an asset's fair
market value and related nonrecourse purchase price, as one factor, in disallowing depreciation
deductions. See, e.g., Odend'hal v. Commissioner, 748 F.2d 908, 912 (4th Cir. 1984) (disallowing
depreciation deduction when nonrecourse purchase price exceeded asset's fair market value by
$2,000,000); Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 1976) (disallow-
ing depreciation deduction when nonrecourse purchase price exceeded motel's fair market value);
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Toyota court may have relied hastily on Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner
without documenting the complete analysis utilized by the Estate of Franklin
court. 82 The Rice's Toyota court implied that, based on Estate of Franklin,
a court will disallow an entire depreciation deduction when the outstanding
balance of a nonrecourse loan exceeds the related asset's fair market value.
83
The Ninth Circuit in Estate of Franklin, however, focused on factors in
addition to the disparity between the nonrecourse purchase price and the
Narver v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 53, 100-01 (1980) (disallowing depreciation deductions when
nonrecourse purchase price exceeded asset's fair market value by $1,400,000) aff'd per curriam
670 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1982); see also REV. RuL. 78-29, 1978-1 C.B. 62 (absent evidence that
value of asset equals nonrecourse purchase price, taxpayer cannot include nonrecourse loan
balance in asset's depreciable basis); REV. RuL. 77-110, 1977-1 C.B. 58 (taxpayer cannot include
balance of nonrecourse loan in asset's depreciable basis when taxpayer cannot show asset's
value equals nonrecourse loan balance); EXAMA-TION TAx SHELTER.S HADBOOx, supra note 9,
at 845 (when fair market value disparity exists along with factors indicating lack of profit
intent, Commissioner generally disallows entire transaction). See generally Bittker, Tax Shelters,
Nonrecourse Debt and the Crane Case, 33 TAX. L. REv. 277 (1978) (analyzing use of nonrecourse
debt in tax shelter transactions); Javaras, Nonrecourse Debt in Real Estate and Other Invest-
ments, 56 TAXES 801, 819 (1978) ( Estate of Franklin provides Commissioner with substantial
support in attacking investments when nonrecourse purchase price exceeds asset's fair market
value); Wangard, Use of Nonrecourse Loans in Tax Planning: The Possibilities and the Pitfalls,
39 J. T^x'N 286 (1973) (discussing Commissioner's attack on use of nonrecourse debt in tax
shelters).
Various courts also have disallowed deductions for interest expense on nonrecourse loans
when the nonrecourse loan balance exceeds the related asset's fair market value. See, e.g.,
Odend'hal, 748 F.2d at 912 (taxpayer cannot deduct interest paid on nonrecourse loans that
exceed fair market value of acquired property); Estate of Franklin, 544 F.2d at 1049 (taxpayer
can deduct interest on nonrecourse debt only when economically reasonable to make underlying
investment); Flowers, 80 T.C. at 942 (when purchase price and underlying nonrecourse debt
exceeds fair market value of purchased property, no genuine indebtedness occurs); Hager v.
Commissioner, 76 T.C. 759, 775 (1981) (when principal balance of nonrecourse debt unreason-
ably exceeds value of acquired property, indebtedness is not genuine and taxpayers are not
entitled to deduct related interest expense); Narver, 75 T.C. at 98 (courts do not allow taxpayers
to take interest deductions on nonrecourse debt when nonrecourse purchase price exceeds asset's
fair market value); Beck v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1534, 1552 (1980) (in nonrecourse debt
situations, indebtedness is genuine only if the underlying collateral bears reasonable relationship
to debt balance), aff'd 678 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1982).
82. See 752 F.2d at 95 (Rice's Toyota court relied upon Ninth Circuit's analysis in Estate
of Franklin v. Commissioner to disallow depreciation deduction); Estate of Franklin, 544 F.2d
at 1048 (excess of nonrecourse purchase price over asset's fair market value does not represent
investment in property upon which taxpayer can support depreciation expense deduction).
Congress has codified in the Internal Revenue Code (Code) the principle stated in Estate of
Franklin, that the depreciable basis of an asset purchased with nonrecourse loans cannot exceed
the asset's fair market value. See I.R.C. § 1274(b)(3)(A) (West 1985) (in potentially abusive
situation, principal amount of debt assumed to purchase property equals asset's fair market
value); id. § 1274(b)(3)(B)(II) (potentially abusive situation includes purchase of asset using
nonrecourse loans); see also JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 119 (Comm.
Print 1984) (noting that § 1274 paralleled Estate of Franklin).
83. See 752 F.2d at 95 (Rice's Toyota court implied that when outstanding balance of
nonrecourse loan balance exceeds asset's fair market value the court will disallow entire
depreciation deduction).
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asset's fair market value in disallowing the depreciation deduction.4 Never-
theless, the Fourth Circuit properly disallowed the depreciation deduction."5
Several courts have evaluated sale and leaseback transactions based on
economic substance to determine whether the transaction deserves recognition
for tax purposes.16 The Tax Court, in Dunlap v. Commissioner,s7 evaluated
the economic substance of a sale and leaseback transaction involving a
building.88 In upholding the transaction, the Dunlap court relied primarily
on the fact that the building's residual value would provide a sufficient
return to enable the taxpayer to recognize a gain from the overall transac-
tion.89 Additionally, the Tax Court noted that the rents from the initial lease
term provided sufficient funds to repay the debt used to purchase the
building.90 In contrast, the Rice's Toyota lease involved an asset almost
surely to depreciate in value over the lease term, and the leasing revenues
provided no opportunity to recoup Rice's Toyota's investment.9'
The Tax Court also focused on asset residual value in evaluating the
economic substance of a sale and leaseback transaction in Estate of Thomas
84. See 544 F.2d at 1047. In Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit evaluated not only the disparity between the asset's fair market
value and nonrecourse purchase price, but also the fact that the seller retained the burdens and
benefits of ownership in the property. Id. The Estate of Franklin court noted that a court will
not disallow an entire depreciation deduction solely because an asset's nonrecourse purchase
price exceeds the asset's fair market value. Id. at 1049; see Narver v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.
53, 101-02 (1980) (disparity between asset's fair market value and nonrecourse purchase price
is merely indication of transaction's validity in context of all circumstances) aff'd per curiam
670 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Brannen v. Commissioner, 722 F.2d 695, 701 (11th Cir.
1984) (describing procedure used by court in disallowing depreciation deduction); REv. RUL.
82-224, 1982-2 C.B. 5, 6 (describing procedure used by Commissioner to disallow depreciation
deduction).
85. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit determined that lease
transaction contained no business purpose or economic substance).
86. See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978) (evaluating sale and
leaseback of bank building to determine whether transaction contained economic substance);
Estate of Thomas v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 412 (1985) (analyzing sale and leaseback of
computer to determine whether transaction contained economic substance); Flowers v. commis-
sioner, 80 T.C. 914 (1983) (disallowing sale and leaseback of master recordings based on
economic substance analysis); Hager v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 759 (1981) (disallowing sale and
leaseback of cattle based on economic substance analysis); Dunlap v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.
1377 (1980) (upholding validity of sale and leaseback of warehouse when residual value
projection showed strong potential for profitability), rev'd on other grounds, 670 F.2d 785 (8th
Cir. 1982); Hilton v. .Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305 (1980) (disallowing sale and leaseback of
department store based on analysis of transactions economic substance), aff'd per curiam, 671
F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1982) cert. denied 459 U.S. 907 (1982); Narver v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 53
(1980) (disallowing sale and leaseback transaction involving rental property, based on economic
substance analysis), aff'd per curiam, 670 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1982).
87. 74 T.C. 1377 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 670 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1982).
88. Id. at 1431.
89. Id. at 1437. In Dunlap v. Commissioner, the seller built the leased building in an
expanding, industrial location. Id. at 1436.
90. Id. at 1437.
91. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (Rice's Toyota's lease transaction lacked
potential to recouperate recourse investment).
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v. Commissioner.92 The Estate of Thomas taxpayer invested in a partnership
that entered into several sale and leaseback transactions involving com-
puters.93 The partnership financed the lease transactions with nonrecourse
debt. 94 The Tax Court distinguished the Estate of Thomas lease transactions
from the Rice's Toyota lease transaction on the basis that the Estate of
Thomas computers had sufficient residual values to allow the partnership to
break even on the transactions." Additionally, the Tax Court noted that
because the computer's fair market value approximated the purchase price,
the Estate of Thomas partnership most likely did not intend to abandon the
lease transactions.96
In evaluating the deductability of the interest expense on the recourse
loan, the Fourth Circuit incorrectly determined that Rice's Toyota's recourse
loan created a genuine obligation upon which to base a deduction for interest
expense. 97 Section 163(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides for the
deduction of interest expense without expressly requiring a taxpayer to show
any purpose for the creation and deduction of interest expense. 9 Courts,
however, have formed judicial tests to disallow interest deductions on funds
borrowed to engage in an activity that has no economic substance, apart
from tax avoidance. 99 In the seminal case, Knetsch v. United States,100 the
United States Supreme Court utilized a variant of the sham transaction
doctrine to deny an interest expense deduction.10 ' The Knetsch sham test
suggests that once a court determines that the underlying transaction is a
sham, the court cannot find genuine indebtedness to support an interest
92. 84 T.C. 412 (1985).
93. Id. at 413.
94. Id. at 422. In Estate of Thomas v. Commissioner, the partnership purchased the
computer equipment paying $945,673 in cash and issuing nonrecourse notes for $8,124,561. Id.
95. Id. at 439.
96. Id.
97. See 752 F.2d at 96 (Rice's Toyota court allowed Rice's Toyota's deduction for interest
expense on recourse loan).
98. See I.R.C. § 163(a) (West 1985) (taxpayer can deduct all interest expense incurred
within taxable year on indebtedness). Certain sections of the Code however, limit or exclude
the deductibility of interest expense. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163(d) (West 1985) (limiting interest
deduction on investment indebtedness); id. § 265(2) (disallowing deduction for interest on
indebtedness incurred to purchase tax exempt securities).
99. See Rothschild v. United States, 407 F.2d 404, 406-07 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (analyzing various
tests used by courts to disallow interest expense deductions); see also Goldstein v. Commissioner,
364 F.2d 734, 740 (2d Cir. 1966) (courts should construe § 163(a) of Code to allow deduction
for interest on borrowed funds only when taxpayer borrows funds to engage in purposeful
activity), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967). But see Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. United
States, 499 F. Supp. 615, 621 (M.D. N.C. 1980) (neither legislative history nor express language
of § 163(a) of Code import congressional intent to limit interest expense deductions to situations
involving purposive activity). See generally Kanter, Interest Deduction: Use, Ruse, Refuse, 46
TAXES 794, 821 (1968) (discussing tests used by courts to disallow interest expense deductions);
Packman, How Not to Lose Interest in a Tax Shelter, 52 TAXEs 615, 622 (1974) (analyzing
factors considered by courts to determine whether transaction will support interest deduction).
100. 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
101. Id. at 369.
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deduction. 0 2 The taxpayer in Knetsch engaged in a series of investment
transactions designed solely to create an interest deduction. 03 Because the
transactions lacked economic substance, apart from tax benefits, the Knetsch
court determined that the transactions were shams."04 The Fourth Circuit
utilized the Knetsch sham test in Bridges v. Commissioner.'0 - In Bridges, the
taxpayer also engaged in an investment transaction designed solely to generate
an interest deduction.'0 The Bridges taxpayer, however, used recourse debt
to finance the transaction. 0 7 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit held that,
because the transaction contained no chance of appreciably affecting the
taxpayer's economic interest, apart from tax reduction, the transaction
constituted a sham and could not support an interest expense deduction. 08
Similarly, the Rice's Toyota court determined that the Rice's Toyota lease
transaction constituted a sham.109 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit should not
have concluded that the recourse note could support an interest expense
deduction. The policy behind the tax laws does not encourage taxpayers to
invest in transactions solely to decrease tax liability."l0
In combining both the subjective business purpose and objective eco-
nomic substance tests to define what constitutes a sham transaction, the
Rice's Toyota court apparently attempted to state explicitly the analysis
implicitly applied by the United States Supreme Court in Frank Lyon & Co. v.
United States."' In Frank Lyon, the Supreme Court, in determining that a
sale leaseback transaction did not constitute a sham, held that the Commis-
sioner should honor multiple party transactions containing economic sub-
stance, apart from tax benefits, which business or regulatory realities
102. Id.
103. Id. at 363.
104. Id. at 369.
105. 325 F.2d 180, 184 (4th Cir. 1963).
106. Id. at 181-83. In Bridges v. Commissioner, the taxpayer purchased government
securities with bank loans. Id. at 182. The interest rate on the bank loans exceeded the yield on
government securities. Id. The taxpayer deducted the interest from the bank loans, on his tax
return. Id. at 183.
107. Id. at 182. The Rice's Toyota court placed significant emphasis on the fact that Rice's
Toyota was obligated on the $280,000 recourse loan. 752 F.2d at 96. A commentator has noted
that liability alone does not create a genuine obligation upon which a deduction for interest can
be supported. See Klein, Interest Expense Must Meet Several Conditions Before a Taxpayer
Will Be Allowed a Deduction, 14 TAx'N FOR ACCT. 14, 15 (1975) (even if taxpayer is liable for
note, courts will not allow interest deduction when no purpose for transactions exists other than
creation of tax deduction).
108. 325 F.2d at 185.
109. See 752 F.2d at 95 ( Rice's Toyota court determined that lease transaction was sham).
110. See Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d at 742. Courts would frustrate the purpose
of § 163(a) of the Code if courts allowed deductions for interest on money to finance activities
designed to avoid tax liability. Id.
I 11. See 752 F.2d at 91 (Fourth Circuit in Rice's Toyota Agreed with Tax Court's conclusion
that Frank Lyon Co. v. United States implicitly mandates analysis of both business purpose
and economic substance tests in determining whether transaction constitutes sham); Frank Lyon
Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583 (1978) (upholding sale and leaseback transaction that
contained nontax business purpose and economic substance).
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necessitate." 2 In Frank Lyon, the taxpayer (Lyon) entered into a sale and
leaseback transaction with Worthen Bank (Worthen), involving the construc-
tion of Worthen's office building and headquarters." The Frank Lyon Court
implicitly analyzed the lease transaction's business purpose by focusing on
the fact that banking regulations necessitated the transaction's form." 4 In
implicitly analyzing the lease transaction's economic substance, the Frank
Lyon Court noted that the parties had structured the lease to enable Lyon
to recoup the total investment and pay off the related debt by the end of
the lease term." ' Additionally, the Frank Lyon Court noted that the parties
engaged in extensive arm's length negotiations to determine the transaction's
terms." '6 Accordingly, the Supreme Court's analysis in Frank Lyon formed
the genesis for the Fourth Circuit's definition of a sham transaction in Rice's
Toyota. "1
7
A literal interpretation of the Fourth Circuit's sham transaction defini-
tion imports an understanding that a court will evaluate separately, both the
subjective business purpose and objective economic substance tests before
concluding that a transaction constitutes a sham." 8 Accordingly, a taxpayer
might infer that, once a court determines a transaction contains a nontax
business purpose, a court will honor a transaction regardless of a transac-
tion's economic substance. Similarly, a taxpayer might conclude that a Court
will apply an objective analysis to determine whether a transaction contains
economic substance before disallowing a transaction that lacks a business
purpose. Such a literal interpretation of the Fourth Circuit's two-pronged
definition of a sham, however, is illusory." 9 In the context of sale and
leaseback transactions, the subjective business purpose and objective eco-
nomic substance tests are interdependent.' 2 0 Economic substance or profita-
bility, apart from tax benefits, is a fundamental business purpose . 2'
112. 435 U.S. at 583.
113. Id. at 563.
114. Id. at 563-64. In Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, state usury laws made issuance of
debt securities impracticable because the securities would not be marketable at the maximum
legal rate. Id. at 563. Additionally, state laws required state approval of all bank expenditures
for premises in excess of 40% of the bank's capital accounts. Id. at 564. Regulatory authorities
indicated that they would not grant the necessary approval. Id.
115. Id. at 566. In Frank Lyon, the lease agreement contained purchase option provisions
allowing Worthen to purchase the bank building for a specific price at certain intervals. Id. at
567. Additionally, Frank Lyon Co. purchased the property using recourse debt. Id. at 577.
116. Id. at 564.
117. See supra note I I and accompanying text (Rice's Toyota court followed Frank Lyon
in developing definition of sham transaction).
118. See 752 F.2d at 91 ( Rice's Toyota court looked to both subjective business purpose
and objective economic substance tests in defining sham transaction).
119. See infra note 121 and accompanying text (business purpose test and economic
substance test are interdependent).
120. See infra note 121 and accompanying text (economic substance apart from tax benefits
is fundamental business purpose).
121. See Zmuda v. Commissioner, 731 F.2d 1417, 1420 (9th Cir. 1984) (no real difference
exists between business purpose and economic substance tests); Bittker, Judicial Doctrines,
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Accordingly, a taxpayer will have a difficult time showing that a business
purpose exists, absent economic substance, unless the taxpayer can show
some regulatory or independent considerations compelling the initiation of
the transaction.'2
In evaluating the practical consequences of the Fourth Circuit's sham
transaction definition, a taxpayer also could misinterpret the effect of the
use of the subjective standard of the business purpose test. 23 A taxpayer
might infer that, when determining a taxpayer's subjective motivations for
entering a particular transaction, a court will look only to a taxpayer's
individual perceptions of a particular transaction. Courts, however, when
evaluating the subjective mental state of a taxpayer, place more emphasis on
the objectives of taxpayers as a group than on the mental state of a particular
individual before the court. 24 When a court finds that taxpayers as a group
are likely to enter a particular type of transaction to reduce taxes rather than
achieve nontax objectives, a court generally will find that the transaction
lacks a business purpose. 25 Additionally, because the temptation to reduce
taxes is pervasive, when a transaction contains significant tax reduction
benefits, a taxpayer will have to produce substantial evidence to show that
the taxpayer entered the transaction with a purpose other than tax avoid-
ance. '26
A taxpayer also could formulate a false sense of security in relying on
the Fourth Circuit's use of the objective standard for the economic substance
test. 27 In practical application, courts diminish the objectivity of the eco-
supra note 5, at 716 (formulation that transaction lacks economic substance is another way of
saying transaction lacks business purpose); Rosenburg & Weinstein, Sale-Leaseback Transactions
After Frank Lyon Company, 2 EVALUATING TAx SHELTERS OFFERINGS 419, 425 (1982) (economic
substance or potential to earn profit is business purpose).
122. Cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. at 564 (banking regulations compelled
parties to structure transaction in form of sale and leaseback).
123. See 752 F.2d at 95 ( Rice's Toyota court adopted subjective standard for business
purpose test).
124. See Bittker, supra note 5, at 702 (discussing motive and intent in tax cases).
125. Id.; see Blum, Motive, Intent and Purpose in Federal Income Taxation, 34 U. Cm.
L. REv. 485, 498 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Blum, Motive, Intent and Purpose]. Courts base
tests of subjective mental state on inferences drawn from taxpayer's statement and other facts
related to a taxpayer's thoughts. Id. Courts recognize certain taxpayer characteristics as indicative
of a certain mental state when particular taxpayer conduct occurs repeatedly in a specific area
of taxation. Id. at 504.
126. See Blum, Motive, Intent and Purpose, supra note 125, at 498. Courts balance the
taxpayer's nontax objectives against the tax reduction objectives in determining whether the
transaction contains a valid business purpose. Id. at 516. The taxpayer has the burden of
showing an important nontax goal in order to dispel the conclusion that the tax reduction
objectives did not amount to tax avoidance. Id. at 498. A factor that the taxpayer must
overcome in mitigating the tax benefits of a transaction is the fact that courts can translate tax
benefits into dollar terms, while courts often cannot quantify nontax benefits. Id. at 522.
Accordingly, when a transaction generates large tax benefits, courts can identify more easily a
tax reduction purpose. Id.
127. See 752 F.2d at 95 ( Rice's Toyota Court adopted objective standard for economic
substance test).
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nomic substance test by relying on the subjective opinions of expert witnesses,
to establish the data underlying the court's objective conclusions. 28 Accord-
ingly, courts can use the hindsight of expert testimony to second-guess the
business judgment of taxpayers. 29
By following the precedence of tax cases factually similar to Rice's
Toyota, the Fourth Circuit could have disallowed the depreciation and
interest expense deductions without defining a sham transaction. 3 0 The
Fourth Circuit, however, probably selected Rice's Toyota to express clearly
a definition of a sham transaction, in an attempt to offer some precedent of
value for taxpayers and tax practitioners.' Commentators have noted that
sale and leaseback cases generally have provided little precedential value due
to the significant emphasis placed on the factual considerations particular to
each case. 3 2 Accordingly, in Rice's Toyota, the Fourth Circuit attempted to
establish clear guidelines to assist taxpayers in structuring financial transac-
tions.'
Rice's Toyota carries several additional implications for Fourth Circuit
taxpayers. Because of the interdependent nature of the business purpose and
economic substance tests taxpayers, generally, will have to show the presence
of economic benefits to avoid disallowance of a transaction. 34 Courts have
128. See, e.g., Estate of Thomas v. Commissioner, 84 T.E. 412 (1985) (evaluating expert
testimony in determining adequacy of computer's residual value); Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1221, 1239) (1981) (analyzing expert testimony in determining fair
market value of investment property); Hilton, 74 T.C. at 350 (relying on expert testimony in
determining adequacy of building's residual value).
129. See Wright v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 508, 513 (D. Nev. 1965) (criticizing use of
expert testimony to second guess business judgment of investors in tax cases); see also Rosenburg
& Weinstein, supra note 121, at 430 (because courts and Internal Revenue Service can utilize
hindsight of expert testimony to second guess businessmen's judgment on rates of return,
businessmen must enter business transactions with caution).
130. See, e.g., Estate of Franklin, 544 F.2d at 1049 (disallowing sale and leaseback of
motel because transaction lacked economic substance); Hilton, 74 T.C. at 361 (disallowing sale
and leaseback of department store because transaction lacked economic substance); Narver, 75
T.C. at 102 (disallowing sale and leaseback of building because transaction lacked economic
substance).
131. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (decisions based on some variation of
substance over form analysis yield little precedental value).
132. See Weiss, The Crane Case Updated, 32 TAx LAw. 289, 299 (1979) ( Frank Lyon Co.
offers little precedental value because Supreme court failed to establish broad principle and
focused on particular facts of case); cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978);
see also Wolfman, The Supreme Court in the Lyon's Den: A Failure of Judicial Process, 66
CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1099 (1981) (Supreme Court's holding in Frank Lyon Co., contains
little precedental value because Supreme Court relied on 26 factors in deciding case); Comment,
Sale-and-Leaseback: Shelter or Sham, 8 GOLDEN GATE 219, 227 (1977) ( Estate of Franklin v.
Commissioner offers little precedental value because of court's concentration on case's particular
facts); cf. Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976).
133. See supra note 131-33 and accompanying text (previous sale and leaseback cases have
provided little precedental value).
134. See Lefevre, The Tax Law of Lease Transactions Revisited, 53 TAXEs 764, 776 (1975)
(to avoid application of sham transaction doctrine, taxpayers should structure lease transactions
to provide modest cash flow or provide potential profit from residual value). See generally
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tended to uphold transactions that offered economic benefits to taxpayers.'
In evaluating a transaction's economic benefits, courts probably will look
primarily to the potential for a return on investment through realization of
residual value or cash flow. 3 6 Another implication of Rice's Toyota for
Fourth Circuit taxpayers is that, when relying on Rice's Toyota's sham
definition to structure financial transactions, taxpayers should consider cau-
tiously the prescribed tests. In addition, Fourth Circuit taxpayers should
consider the probability that, when a court evaluates a transaction, the court
might utilize the subjective opinion of expert testimony to decide whether a
transaction is legitimate for tax purposes. 37 Finally, while Rice's Toyota
dealt specifically with a sale and leaseback transaction, the Fourth Circuit




Rosenburg & Weinstein, supra note 121, at 419 (summarizing court decisions involving sale and
leaseback transactions subsequent to Frank Lyon).
135. See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. at 566 (considering fact that
parties structured lease payments to recoup Lyon's investment); Estate of Thomas v. Commis-
sioner, 84 T.C. 412 (1985) (evaluating fact that computer's residual value was sufficient to
generate overall profit on transaction, in upholding transaction as valid); Dunlap v. Commis-
sioner, 74 T.C. at 1431 (in upholding transaction as valid, Tax Court focused primarily on
property's potential residual value to generate gain on overall transaction).
136. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (analysis of factors considered by courts
in upholding sale and leaseback transactions).
137. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (courts reduce objectivity of economic
substance test through use of subjective expert testimony).
138. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text (courts have evaluated various types of
transactions using either business purpose or economic substance test).
